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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN MARIE BRADFORD ; 
Plaintifl7Appellee ] 
vs. ] 
WILLIAM R. BRADFORD II ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) COURT OF APPEALS NO. 950317-CA 
) PRIORITY NO. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah 
Code Ann. and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the cost to provide medical insurance 
for the two minor children is the difference between the "employee plus one" dependent rate (the 
couple rate) and the "employee plus two or more" dependents rate (the family rate)? The 
standard of review for this issue is the clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 
P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that after July 1, 1994 (the effective date of 
Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Ann.) Mr. Bradford could only deduct one-half of the 
childrens' portion of the monthly medical insurance premium from his child support payment? 
The standard of review for this issue is the de novo or correction of error standard. Saunders v. 
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Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991)(per curiam). 
3. Did the trial court err in awarding Mrs. Bradford a judgment against Mr. 
Bradford for the difference between the amount of child support Mr. Bradford paid and the 
amount he would have been required to pay had he not falsely represented to the court at the first 
trial that the amount deducted from his paycheck for insurance was solely for the benefit of his 
two minor children? The standard of review for this issue is the de novo or correction of error 
standard. Saunders v. Sharp, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); 
The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. (A 
copy of the entire §78-45-7.15 is attached hereto as Addendum 1). 
STATEiMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff?Appellee Karen Marie Bradford Hogan (hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. 
Bradford") married defendant/appellant William R. Bradford II (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. 
Bradford") in 1986. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Bradford was a 33 year old electrical 
engineer employed by Bechtel Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Bechtel") on the 
construction of the Intermountain Power Plant near Delta, Utah. Mrs. Bradford was an 18 year 
old high school graduate. During the marriage two daughters were born to the parties. In 1991, 
the parties divorced and a decree was entered pursuant to the terms of a stipulation. The Decree 
of Divorce awarded Mrs. Bradford custody of the minor children and ordered Mr. Bradford to 
pay child support in the amount of from $600.00 to $1,200.00 per month depending upon various 
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scenarios regarding Mr. Bradford's employment. Prior to the divorce, Mr. Bradford had a 
minimum income of $5,000.00 per month. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 82) (Pages of the Feb. 
16, 1994 transcript cited in this brief are attached hereto as Addendum 2.) 
In 1993, Mr. Bradford filed a petition to modify the Decree of Divorce seeking to 
reduce his child support obligation due to a reduction of his income. Trial on the petition was 
held February 16, 1994. At that time, Mr. Bradford was on "holding status" with his employer 
and was receiving unemployment compensation. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 40) "Holding 
status" meant that Mr. Bradford maintained his position with the company and eligibility for 
benefits but was unemployed pending reassignment. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 14) The court 
calculated the parties' 1993 income at $23,050.00 per year for Mr. Bradford and $6,000.00 per 
year for Mrs. Bradford. The court found a material change of circumstances between the parties 
and modified the child support obligation based on their 1993 income. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 
1994 pp. 119, 120 and 126) 
A significant issue at trial was the amount of the premium Mr. Bradford was 
required to pay to provide health and medical insurance for the minor children. Mr. Bradford 
testified that the premium amount was approximately $325.00 per month, and that the premium 
provided insurance solely for the two minor children. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70) 
Mr. Bradford testified that his insurance was provided by his employer for "free". (Transcript, 
Feb. 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70) At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that although the 
premium seemed excessive, Mr. Bradford could deduct the full amount of the premium from his 
child support payment. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 124-25) The result was that Mr. Bradford's 
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monthly child support payment was reduced to $169.00 per month. (Order Modifying Judgment 
and Decree, paragraph 5) The court retained jurisdiction of the child support issues and ordered 
the parties within 30 days of any change in their employment status to prepare and serve an 
affidavit attesting to the change. The affidavit would then be submitted to the court for 
determination of a new child support order. (Order Modifying Judgment and Decree paragraph 
3) The court issued its Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce on March 10, 1994. 
Shortly after the trial, Mrs. Bradford became aware that just six days after the 
trial, Mr. Bradford had become reemployed by Bechtel. Mrs. Bradford also learned for the first 
time that Mr. Bradford had remarried in 1993 and had placed his wife on his medical insurance 
in July of 1993. This revelation was in stark contrast to Mr. Bradford's testimony at trial. (See 
Transcript February 16, 1994, pp. 37-39, 70) After learning of these facts, Mrs. Bradford on 
March 21, 1994 filed a Motion to Strike the Order Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Thereafter, on or about April 20, 1994 Mr. Bradford filed a belated affidavit in which he 
acknowledged his reemployment and the fact that his current wife had been enrolled on his 
insurance. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on Mrs. Bradford's Motion to Strike on 
November 9, 1994. Not surprisingly, Mr. Bradford did not appear. He was however, 
represented by counsel. The parties waived any objection to any procedural deficiencies and 
acknowledged that the court could rule on the merits of the issues presented. (Transcript, Nov. 
9, 1995 pp. 19-22) (pages of the Nov. 9, 1995 transcript cited in this brief are attached hereto as 
Addendum 3.) The court received documentary evidence and extensive proffers of evidence by 
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counsel. The central issue at the second hearing was the calculation of the amount of the 
insurance premium Mr. Bradford was required to pay to provide medical insurance for the minor 
children. 
The evidence produced at the second hearing was that Mr. Bradford's employer 
offered insurance to its employees on a three tier premium schedule. There was one rate for an 
employee only, another rate for an employee with one dependent ("the couple rate") and another 
rate for an employee with two or more dependents ("the family rate"). (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994 
pp. 4-5) (See also Affidavit of Defendant In Re Child Support Obligation paragraph 5 and 
Exhibit A attached thereto attached hereto as Addendum 4.) The evidence also showed that in 
addition to the minor children, Mr. Bradford and his current wife were enrolled on the insurance. 
(Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994 pp. 4, 6, 27, 36 and 37) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court ruled that the childrens' portion of the 
insurance premium was the difference between the cost of purchasing insurance at the couple 
rate and purchasing insurance at the family rate. Due a change in the law effective July 1, 1994 
(Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann.), the court also ruled that after July 1, 1994 each party 
was responsible for one-half the cost of the children's portion of the premiums paid. The court 
ordered that prior to July 1, 1994, Mr. Bradford could deduct from his monthly child support 
payment the full amount of the difference between the cost of the couple rate and the cost of the 
family rate (which was $70.00 per month)1 and after July 1, 1994, one-half of the difference 
1
 There was some dispute regarding whether the difference was $65.20 or $78.67. The 
parties eventually stipulated the amount to be $70.00. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, p.66 and Order 
Amending Order Modifying Judgment) 
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between the couple rate and the family rate ($35.00). (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994 pp. 48, 54, 66, 
74-75) 
The court also awarded Mrs. Bradford judgment against Mr. Bradford in the 
amount of $2,567.00 for child support arrearages that Mr. Bradford never paid but for which he 
should have been ordered to pay had the court known at the February trial that Mr. Bradford's 
premium payment included coverage for Mr. Bradford and his current wife. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 
1994 pp. 64-67, 75 and 76) 
Following the November hearing, the court signed its Order Amending Order 
Modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce on January 12, 1995. The Order was filed on 
March 20, 1995 and is the Order from which Mr. Bradford takes his appeal. In overruling Mr. 
Bradford's objection to the proposed order, the court, on January 19, 1995 issued a Ruling on 
Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order which states in pertinent part: 
The court has carefully considered the proposed Order and Defendant's Objection 
to Proposed Order. The fact of the matter is that the second hearing in this case 
was necessary because of defendant's [Mr. Bradford's] material 
misrepresentations to the court under oath at the first hearing. Because defendant 
was not present at the second hearing, the court was not able to inquire and 
determine whether those material misrepresentations were occasioned through 
negligence, gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive this court. 
It is the position of this court that but for the misrepresentations and perhaps 
deceit, the post-July 1994 hearing respecting these issues would not have been 
necessary. 
This court found, at the post-July hearing, through extensive proffer, that the 
insurance arrangement of defendant with his employer was materially and 
substantially different than that represented in the pre-July hearing. (The Ruling 
is attached hereto as Addendum 5.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found that the cost to provide medical insurance for the 
two minor children is the difference between the cost to provide employee plus one dependent 
coverage and employee plus two or more dependents coverage. The court's finding was 
supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. The trial court properly applied Secton 
78-45-7.15(3) to the case after its effective date of July 1, 1994. The statute stands on its own 
and is not dependent upon a change in the child support payment before being applicable. 
Moreover, the November hearing was a mere continuation of the February trial in which the 
court found a material change in the parties' circumstances allowing a modification of the 
Decree. The trial court properly awarded Mrs. Bradford judgment against Mr. Bradford for the 
arrearages Mr. Bradford would have been ordered to pay had he not misrepresented to the court 
the cost of providing insurance to the minor children. As a result of Mr. Bradford's false 
misrepresentations, he is estopped from receiving any relief on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Bradford Has Failed To Marshall The Evidence 
Section 78-45-7.15(3), Utah Code Ann. obligates the court in divorce cases to 
"require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a 
parent for the children's portion of insurance. Practical compliance with such an order is that 
the parent ordered to maintain the insurance, if also obligated to pay child support, simply 
deducts from his or her regular child support payments one-half the cost of the premium paid for 
the childrens' portion of insurance. The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
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calculating the amount of the insurance premium attributable to the minor children and thus the 
amount Mr. Bradford could deduct from his monthly child support payment. That issue was an 
issue of fact on which the trial court made a finding. Order Amending Order Modifying 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Finding No. 5. The court's finding was made after the court 
received evidence regarding the types of medical plans offered by Mr. Bradford's employer, the 
costs of the various plans, the dates of coverage and the number of individuals covered on the 
plan. 
On appeal of a trial court's finding of fact, the appellant has the obligation to 
marshall all evidence supporting the finding and then to demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding. 
Gillmor v.Wright 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); Alta Indus. Ltd.. supra. 846 P.2d at 1286. If 
the appellant fails to meet the burden of marshaling the evidence, the trial court's decision will 
not be disturbed. M.; Pasker v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994). 
Mr. Bradford has neither marshaled the evidence in this case nor has he shown 
that viewing the evidence most favorable to the decision below the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the court's finding. The trial court's decision must be affirmed. Id-
H. The Court's Finding Regarding The Cost Of The Childrens' 
Portion Of The Premium Was Correct 
Mr. Bradford argues on appeal that because four people are insured on the policy 
the trial court should have calculated the childrens' portion of the premium to be one-half its 
cost. That argument may have merit if Bechtel had only one rate schedule. However, the 
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evidence is undisputed that Bechtel has a three tier rate schedule. The schedule itself determines 
the cost of the premium Mr. Bradford is required to pay for the two minor children. That amount 
is $70.00. Calculation of a different amount would ignore the facts. 
Moreover, any other amount would defy logic. Section 78-45-7.15(1) and (2) 
empowers the trial court with broad discretion in assigning which party is required to provide 
insurance for the minor children. Had the trial court ordered Mrs. Bradford to provide the 
insurance, Mr. Bradford could only reduce his premium by $70.00 and still maintain coverage 
for himself and his current wife. Under every reasonable analysis, the cost to insure the minor 
children is $70.00. The courts finding that the childrens' portion of the insurance premium is the 
difference between the couple rate and the family rate is not clearly erroneous. The court's 
ruling should be affirmed. Gillmor. supra- 850 P.2d at 433. 
Section 78-45-7.15(4) Utah Code Ann. does not change the analysis. As the trial 
court correctly observed: 
I would read that [Section 78-45-7.15(4)] specifically where you have a premium 
that would involve a single person, and then you would have one that involves a 
family situation. 
Where you specifically have one that applies to a couple rate, and then you can 
easily calculate the difference between a couple rate and a couple plus children, 
then that seems to me to be in the best interest of the minor children to allow that 
offset as opposed to a pro rata which I think is more applicable under a situation 
where there's an indistinquishable amount, where there's no distinction between a 
couple rate and a couple plus children. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 74-75) 
Moreover, under Utah Law the court is required to consider the best interests of 
the minor children, not only in determining custody, but also in determining other obligations of 
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the parties. See Rosendahl v. Rosendahl. 876 P.2d 870 (Utah App. 1994). Likewise, the clear 
intent of Section 78-45-7.15(1) and (2) is that insurance for the minor children should be 
maintained by the party who can do so at the most reasonable cost. It cannot be disputed that the 
interests of the minor children are better served by having more of the child support payment go 
directly to the children rather than using the payment to purchase insurance for Mr. Bradford and 
his current wife. Mr. Bradford should not be entitled to use child support funds to supplement 
the purchase of his and his wife's insurance simply because the court ordered him rather than 
Mrs. Bradford to provide insurance. The court was correct when it calculated the childrens' 
portion of the insurance to be the difference between the couple rate and the family rate. 
in. The Trial Court Properly Ruled That After July l, 1994 
Mr. Bradford Could Qnly Deduct From 
His Child Support Payment One-Half Of The 
Cost Of The Children?' Portion Qf The insurance Premium 
Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann., which requires divorced parties to share 
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's 
portion of insurance, became effective July 1, 1994. Prior to the enactment of §78-45-7.15(3) 
the law allowed a parent to deduct from his or her child support payment the fiill amount of the 
cost to provide medical insurance for the minor children. The court ruled at the February 16, 
1994 trial that Mr. Bradford could deduct the full $325.00 premium payment from his monthly 
child support payment. At the November 9, 1994 hearing the court ruled that §78-45-7.15(3) 
now applied to the case and ordered that Mr. Bradford could only deduct one-half of the 
children's portion of the premium from his child support payment. 
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Mr. Bradford claims on appeal that Section 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Ann., does 
not govern this case because that provision is somehow inseparably connected to the Utah Child 
Support Guidelines which were also amended effective July 1, 1994. Mr. Bradford claims the 
insurance provisions of the divorce decree can only be modified when there is a simultaneous 
modification of the child support obligation. Because the Child Support Guidelines as amended 
July 1, 1994 did not justify a 25% increase in the amount of child support Mr. Bradford was 
required to pay, (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1995 p. 56) Mr. Bradford argues there was not a material 
change of circumstances between the parties. He thus claims the decree cannot be modified to 
reflect the new insurance requirements of Section 78-45-7.15(3). 
Mr. Bradford's argument fails for two reasons. First, the Guidelines and the 
insurance provisions are not inseparably connected but stand on their own. Nothing in the 
express wording of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act precludes a court from enforcing 
Section 78-45-7.15(3) in the absence of modification of a parties child support obligation. 
Rather the express language of the statute requires the court to make such orders anytime the 
issue is presented. Under Utah Law statutes are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary 
meaning. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm.. 890 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1995). The issue 
was presented to the court on November 9, 1994 and the court properly applied the statute. 
Second, due to Mr. Bradford's false representations, the November 9, 1994 
hearing was in substance a continuation of the February trial. At the February trial the court 
found a substantial change in the parties' circumstances and allowed modification of the original 
Decree of Divorce. (Transcript, Feb. 16, 1994 p. 119 and 120) The second hearing did not occur 
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because of a new petition to modify, but rather was required simply to rectify the mistakes of the 
first trial brought on solely by Mr. Bradford's false representations. Thus, even if we assume, 
arguendo, that §78-45-7.15(3) is only applicable when there is a material change in the parties' 
circumstances, the finding by the court in February of a change of circumstances satisfied that 
requirement. The mere fact the law was changed between the two hearings is the risk Mr. 
Bradford took when he chose to deceive the court. 
In Shelton v. Shelton. 885 P.2d 807 (Utah App. 1994) the court stated the well 
established rule that: 
A material misrepresentation or concealment of assets or financial condition as a 
result of which alimony or property awarded is less or more than otherwise would 
have been provided for is a proper ground for which the court may grant relief to 
the party who was offended by such misrepresentation or concealment, absent 
other equities such as latches or negligence. 
See also Clissnld v. Clissold. 519 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1994) and Bnyra v Rovce. 609 P.2d 928, 
931 (Utah 1980). 
Mr. Bradford clearly misrepresented his financial condition and as a result his 
child support obligation was less than it would have been had he not made such representations. 
Mr. Bradford has no standing to complain about a court ruling necessitated solely because of his 
inappropriate conduct 
IV. The Court Properly Awarded Mrs. Bradford 
Judgment For Child Support Arrearages 
Without citing relevant authority or making logical argument Mr. Bradford also 
claims the judgment for arreages was improper. Despite the attempted confusion, there is one 
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fact that is certain. Had Mr. Bradford not misrepresented the facts regarding his insurance at the 
February trial, the court would have made the proper child support order and the arreages would 
not exist. Mr. Bradford cannot be heard to complain about having to make good on an obligation 
he should not have been able to avoid in the first instance. JJL; Glover v. Glover. 242 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1952). 
V. Mr. Bradford Should Be Estopped Bv His Wrongful 
Conduct From Obtaining Any Relief Qn Appeal 
As previously addressed, material misrepresentations of a party's financial 
condition in a court proceeding is proper grounds for a court to grant relief to the party offended 
by the misrepresentations. Id, Aside from the fact Mr. Bradford's arguments on appeal fail for 
lack of a legal or factual basis, Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations alone should preclude him 
from receiving any relief in this appeal. 
At the November hearing the trial court did not have the benefit of Mr. Bradford's 
presence in order to determine whether Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations "were accompanied 
through negligence, gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive [the] court". 
Ruling on Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order. Neither did the court have the benefit of 
the transcript from the first trial in order to determine whether Mr. Bradford's misrepresentations 
were deliberate. As a result the court denied Mrs Bradford's claim for attorney's fees. 
(Transcript Nov. 9, 1994 p. 67) 
With the benefit of the transcript of the February trial the record is clear that Mr. 
Bradford intentionally deceived the court. In response to questions posed by his counsel, Mr. 
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Bradford stated: 
Q. Do you believe that you'll be able to continue to maintain health insurance 
and dental insurance on the girls? 
A. You bet. 
Q. How much does that cost you a month right now, do you know? 
A. Well, mine is free because I've been with the company. So what lam 
paying is specifically for them. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994, p. 37)(emphasis 
added) 
Upon being shown Exhibit One which was a check stub from his employer, Mr. 
Bradford was asked the following questions and gave the following responses to his counsel: 
Q. Would you look at Exhibit No. 2 and just tell me briefly what that is? 
A. This is a check stub for the pay period ending 30 January of 1994. And 
really what this is, is my vacation hours on 39 and-a-half being paid to me, 
and then deductions. 
Q. Did they deduct for health insurance and dental insurance? 
A Yes, they did. For Metropolitan, $875.42, and for dental $60.51. 
Q. It 's your testimony that these deductions then are to pay for the insurance 
applicable only to your daughters? 
A That is correct. 
Q. Because yours is free? I meanf the company provides it as part of your 
benefits. 
A The company provides mine. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994 p. 39)(emphasis 
added) 
Upon cross examination by Mrs. Bradford's counsel Mr. Bradford gave the 
following responses to the following questions: 
Q. You've indicated that you cashed in your vacation time and paid how 
many months premium for health insurance? 
A Three months until April 27. 
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Q. And the health and dental insurance, are you sure that's paid out of every 
pay check or is that paid just once a month? 
A. It's paid out of every pay check, every two week period. 
Q. And it's not — and you 're sure that no portion of that is for you? 
A. I'm sure. Bechtel policy states if you've been with the company five 
years or more, your insurance is paid for by them. That goes with 
longevity with the company. (Transcript Feb. 16, 1994 P. 70)(emphasis 
added) 
We now know based on the evidence presented at the November hearing that: (1) 
Mr. Bradford's insurance was not free; and (2) the insurance premium he paid was not solely to 
provide insurance for the minor children, but was also to purchase insurance for Mr. Bradford 
and his current wife. (Transcript, Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 4, 6, 27, 36 and 37) Because the 
misrepresentations are so blatent, no other conclusion can be reached than Mr. Bradford willfully 
lied. Such conduct should estop him from receiving any relief on this appeal. 
The record is also clear that the court would have awarded Mrs. Bradford her 
attorney's fees in the amount of $680.00 (Transcript Nov. 9, 1994, pp. 57, 67) had the court 
known that Mr. Bradford willfully lied. Because it is now clear from the transcript that Mr. 
Bradford did willfully lie, this court should award Mrs. Bradford her attorney's fees from the 
previous hearings and her attorney's fees on appeal.2 
2
 The fact that Mrs. Bradford has not cross-appealed in this case for attorney's fees 
should not preclude this court from awarding her fees. Donald Eyre, her counsel in the lower 
court was appointed a District Court Judge and was required to withdraw as counsel. Mrs. 
Bradford's new counsel was not retained until June of 1995 and of course did not learn of Mr. 
Bradford's misrepresentations until reading the trasncript in preparation of this brief. Mr. 
Bradford will not be prejudiced by the request for attorney's fees as he can respond to the 
request in his Reply Brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the trial courts' decision should be affirmed and plaintiff 
appellee Karen Marie Bradford Hogan should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees at the 
lower court and on appeal. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 1996. 
IVIN D BAGLEY \ 
/ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to be mailed postage prepaid this 18th day of January, 1996 to the following: 
Dexter L. Anderson, Esq. 
Star Route Box 52 
750 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
T\ />-/] 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
521 JUDICIAL CODE 78-45-7.16 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Number of Children 
3 4 
Monthly Adj. 
Gross Income Number of Children 
2 3 4 5 
From 
4,901 
5,001 
5,101 
5,201 
5,301 -
5,401 • 
5,501 • 
5,601 • 
5,701 • 
5,801 • 
5,901 -
6,001 • 
6,101 • 
6,201 -
6,301 • 
6,401 -
6,501 • 
6,601 • 
6,701 -
6,801 • 
6,901 • 
7,001 -
7,101 -
7,201 • 
7,301 -
7,401 • 
7,501 -
7,601 -
7,701 • 
7,801 -
7,901 -
8,001 -
8,101 -
8,201 -
8,301 -
8,401 -
8,501 -
8,601 -
8,701 -
8,801 -
8,901 -
9,001 -
9,101 -
9,201 -
9,301 -
9,401 -
9,501 -
9,601 -
9,701 -
9,801 -
9,901 -
10,001 -
l b 
• 5,000 
• 5,100 
• 5,200 
• 5,300 
5,400 
5,500 
5,600 
5,700 
5,800 
5,900 
6,000 
6,100 
6,200 
6,300 
6,400 
6,500 
6,600 
6,700 
6,800 
6,900 
7,000 
7,100 
7,200 
7,300 
7,400 
7,500 
7,600 
7,700 
7,800 
7,900 
8,000 
8,100 
8,200 
8,300 
8,400 
8,500 
8,600 
8,700 
8,800 
8,900 
9,000 
9,100 
9,200 
9,300 
9,400 
9,500 
9,600 
9,700 
9,800 
9,900 
10,000 
10,100 
From lb 
534 
541 
547 
554 
561 
568 
575 
582 
586 
591 
596 
601 
605 
610 
615 
620 
624 
629 
629 
673 
680 
687 
694 
701 
706 
710 
715 
719 
723 
728 
732 
737 
741 
746 
750 
755 
759 
763 
768 
772 
777 
781 
786 
790 
795 
799 
803 
808 
812 
817 
821 
826 
1,002 
1,015 
1,028 
1,042 
1,055 
1,068 
1,081 
1,093 
1,103 
1,112 
1,122 
1,131 
1,141 
1,150 
1,159 
1,169 
1,178 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,189 
1,197 
1,205 
1,213 
1,220 
1,228 
1,236 
1,244 
1,252 
1,259 
1,267 
1,275 
1,283 
1,291 
1,298 
1,306 
1,314 
1,322 
1,330 
1,337 
1,345 
1,353 
1,361 
1,369 
1,376 
1,384 
1,392 
1,400 
1,226 
1,245 
1,264 
1,282 
1,300 
1,317 
1,335 
1,351 
1,367 
1,383 
1,398 
1,414 
1,430 
1,445 
1,461 
1,480 
1,495 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,520 
l ,53l 
1,541 
1,551 
1,562 
1,572 
1,582 
1,592 
1,603 
1,613 
1,623 
1,633 
1,644 
1,654 
1,664 
1,675 
1,685 
1,695 
1,705 
1,716 
1,726 
1,736 
1,747 
1,757 
1,767 
1,777 
1,788 
1,798 
1,808 
1,450 
1,475 
1,500 
1,522 
1,544 
1,566 
1,588 
1,610 
1,632 
1,653 
1,675 
1,697 
1,719 
1,740 
1,762 
1,791 
1,812 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,841 
1,853 
1,864 
1,876 
1,887 
1,899 
1,911 
1,922 
1,934 
1,945 
1,957 
1,969 
1,980 
1,992 
2,003 
2,015 
2,027 
2,038 
2,050 
2,061 
1,580 
1,607 
1,634 
1,658 
1,682 
1,706 
1,730 
1,754 
1,778 
1,802 
1,826 
1,850 
1,874 
1,897 
1,921 
1,951 
1,975 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
2,000 
2,013 
2,026 
2,039 
2,052 
2,064 
2,077 
2,090 
2,103 
2,116 
2,129 
2,141 
2,154 
2,167 
2,180 
2,193 
2,206 
2,218 
2,231 
2,244 
2,257 
2,270 
LOW INCOME TABLE 
(Obligor Parent Only) 
1,687 
1,717 
1,746 
1,772 
1,797 
1,823' 
1,848 
1,874 
1,899 
1,925 
1,950 
1,976 
2,001 
2,026 
2,052 
2,084 
2,109 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,137 
2,150 
2,164 
2,178 
2,192 
2,206 
2,220 
2,234 
2,247 
2,261 
2,275 
2,289 
2,303 
2,317 
2,330 
2,344 
2,358 
2,372 
2,386 
2,400 
2,414 
2,427 
2,441 
Monthly Adj. 
Gross Income 
From Tb 
650 — 675 
676 — 700 
701 — 725 
726 — 750 
751 — 775 
776 — 800 
801 — 825 
— 850 
851 — 875 
876 — 900 
901 — 925 
1 
23 
45 
68 
90 
113 
2 
23 
46 
68 
91 
114 
137 
159 
182 
205 
228 
250 
Number 
3 
23 
46 
69 
92 
115 
138 
161 
184 
207 
230 
253 
ofChildr 
4 
23 
47 
70 
93 
116 
140 
163 
186 
209 
233 
256 
en 
5 
24 
47 
71 
94 
118 
141 
165 
188 
912 
5 
2o9 
6 
24 
48 
71 
95 
119 
143 
166 
190 
214 
238 
261 
926 — 950 
951 — 975 
976 — 1,000 
1,001 — 1,050 
276 
299 
279 
302 
326 
372 
282 
306 
329 
376 
285 
309 
333 
380 
1994 
78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical 
expenses of the minor children be provided by a parent if it is 
available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to main-
tain insurance for medical expenses, the court or administra-
tive agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the 
out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent 
for the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita 
share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for 
the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium 
amount by the number of persons covered under the policy 
and multiplying the result by the number of children in the 
instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all 
reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, in-
cluding deductibles and copayments, incurred for the depen-
dent children. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide 
verification of coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the 
dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, 
or the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of 
insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar 
days of the date he first knew or should have known of the 
change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical ex-
penses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, 
a parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right 
to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other 
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply 
with Subsections (€) and (7). 199S 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not in-
curred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent 
share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses 
of the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a 
parent shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis 
immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care 
expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be in-
curred, that parent may suspend making monthly pay-
ment of that expense while it is not being incurred, 
without obtaining a modification of the child support 
order. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a 
parent who incurs child care expense shall provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of a child 
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Q Okay. Are you employed now? 
A I am employed by Bechtel Corporation, but I 
am on holding status with that company. 
Q Would you explain that to the Court, what 
that means. 
A Well, holding status means that the company 
will continue to keep your resume active in their 
files and constantly search the projects that they 
have, submitting you to a project engineer to get you 
on a j ob. 
Q Okay. So you don't go to work every day then 
now? 
A That is correct. 
Q And I guess I need to ask you what your 
profession is, what kind of work you do? 
A Ifm an electrical engineer. 
Q When did you first go to work then for 
Bechtel? 
A I went to work -- let's see -- September 
2 8th, 1981. 
Q And they have been your employer then since 
that time? 
A That is correct. 
Q And as an electrical engineer? 
A That is correct. 
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Support Schedule would require you to pay under your 
income status? 
A Oh, definitely. 
Q Whether you're unemployed or whether you are 
employed? 
A Definitely. 
Q Do you believe that you'll be able to 
continue to maintain health insurance and dental 
insurance on the girls? 
A You bet. 
Q How much does that cost you a month right 
now, do you know? 
A Well, mine is free because I've been with the 
company. So what I am paying is specifically for 
them. 
Q Let me hand you a document here so we can 
make sure that's a matter of record. 
MR. ANDERSON: I should have had these 
marked, but I didn't get that done. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Let me hand you what's 
been marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1 and ask if you 
can identify this for the Court. 
A This is a check stub from Bechtel which is 
telling all my deductions. 
Q Okay. And that's for October of '93? 
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080 
38 
A That's correct. A pay period ending 24 
October of '93. 
Q And this basically would have been your last 
payroll stub? 
A That's correct. 
Q Does that show an amount then deducted for 
health care -- or health insurance and dental 
insurance? 
A Dental is $9.06 and the Metropolitan 150 plan 
is what I carry is 129.64. And then I also carried 
life insurance where the girls were the 
co-beneficiaries on this policy. 
Q Are they still co-beneficiaries on the life 
insurance? 
A Oh, yes. And it was for 24.20. 
Q Now, that pay stub then is for a two-week 
period; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q So your monthly cost for health insurance, 
dental insurance, and life insurance would be 
approximately twice that amount; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
MR. EYRE: We'd offer No. 1, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection, counsel? 
MR. EYRE: No. 
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THE COURT: It may be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1 received into 
evidence.) 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Would you look at Exhibit 
No. 2 and just tell me briefly what that is. 
A This is a check stub for the pay period 
ending 30 January of 1994. And really what this is is 
my vacation hours on 39 and-a-half being paid to me, 
and then deductions. 
Q Did they deduct for health insurance and 
dental insurance? 
A Yes, they did. For Metropolitan, $875.42, 
and for dental $60.51. 
Q It's your testimony that these deductions 
then are to pay for the insurance applicable only to 
your daughters? 
A That is correct. 
Q Because yours is free? I mean, the company 
provides it as part of your benefits. 
A The company provides mine. 
MR. ANDERSON: We'd offer Exhibit No. 2. 
THE COURT: Counsel, do you wish to examine 
this document? 
MR. ANDERSON: He has a copy of it. I'm 
sorry. I didn't show it to you. 
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MR. EYRE: No. 
THE COURT: It may be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 2 received into 
evidence.) 
MR. ANDERSON: What I'd like to do is mark a 
series of four documents, your Honor, if I could at 
this time. And it shows his unemployment income at 
the present time. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) I hand you what's been 
marked as Exhibit No. 3. If you'd look at them and 
tell the Court what they are. 
A They're receipts from the Texas Unemployment 
Commission showing a claim date and an amount for 
unemployment insurance. 
Q What periods of time do these cover? 
A From 11 -- starting with 11-21-93 and going 
through 1-9 of •94. 
Q And how much are they for? What's the money 
amount that results from these unemployment checks to 
you? 
A Every two weeks it's $245 -- well, $490 every 
two weeks, being $980 for a four-week period. 
Q Is that currently what you're living on, 
Mr. Bradford? 
A That's correct. 
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A Exactly. I am pursuing work, as I've said 
here in court. 
Q You've indicated that you cashed in your 
vacation time and paid how many months premiums for 
health insurance? 
A Three months until April 27th. 
Q And the health and dental insurance, are you 
sure that's paid out of every paycheck or is that paid 
just once a month? 
A It's paid out of every paycheck, every 
two-week period. 
Q And it's not — and you're sure that no 
portion of that is for you? 
A I'm sure. Bechtel policy states if you've 
been with the company five years or more, your 
insurance is paid for by them. That goes with 
longevity with the company. 
Q Your wife has at no time prevented you from 
visiting with your children; is that correct? 
A Oh, not at all. 
Q She permits you to have telephone visits 
regularly; is that correct? 
A As long as I initiate them. 
Q And --
A She has not let my -- she has not -- my 
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Q Had you discussed the possibility of divorce 
prior to that time? 
A Yes. 
Q He's testified that when he came home for 
Easter break that year that you informed him of your 
desire to have a divorce; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he agree to that? 
A At first he wanted to go -- he wanted to 
fight it. And then I talked to him and told him I 
wanted to go uncontested, and he agreed. 
Q Did the two of you work out terms for that 
divorce? 
A Yes. 
Q At that point in time were you handling the 
finances for the family? 
A Yes. 
Q Approximately how much was Mr. Bradford's 
take-home on a monthly basis prior to that time? 
A A minimum of 5,000 a month. 
Q And was some income for you -- was that a 
concern for you at that time? 
A Yeah. 
Q And did the two of you discuss how much it 
was going to require for you to live on and support 
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counsel or to this Court on a yearly basis their 
earnings for that particular year and issues of child 
care, if that is necessary, with some reasonable 
expectation that there would be an indication at that 
point in time rather than drawing them back from 
Oregon or Nevada or Texas to recompute or reconsider? 
MR. EYRE: That's what I would prefer, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I would prefer that, too. I 
don't want these parties back in this court every six 
months every time their employment is modified, as 
long as it can be reasonably substantiated for a 
reasonable period of time. We ought to be able to sit 
down with the child support obligation worksheet and 
make a determination what the obligations are. 
I'm assuming that the defendant is going to 
to become employed. I hope. And he hopes, I think, 
too. 
MR. BRADFORD: Amen. 
THE COURT: Certainly, the children do, and 
his ex-wife wants him to be employed. We have at 
least four or five different scenarios here because --
is there a change of circumstances since the date of 
the decree? Certainly there is. There's a remarriage 
on the part of the plaintiff. There's unemployment 
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now as it relates to the part of the defendant. 
There's some substantial period of time where 
the plaintiff cohabited with another individual. And 
if a portion of this was to be imputed as alimony, 
then the Court might take that into consideration 
since August of 1992 through August of '93 when she 
did remarry. 
There are factors involved in this particular 
case that are significant. We need to make a 
determination whether we're going to proceed as of May 
of 1993 with the reasonable expectation that that will 
be periodically reviewed automatically by the Court 
upon presentment of child support obligation 
worksheets from the parties. 
Whether that's every six months or it's once 
a year, whenever it may be done, so it can be modified 
without the necessity of travel, attorneys' fees, 
costs, and all of those things. 
MR. ANDERSON: We certainly agree with that. 
There has to be some kind of a vehicle, but there is 
no problem with that. 
THE COURT: I think that can work. I think 
that through counsel that we can do that without 
extreme expense. It can be supported either by 
affidavit and any work or employment paycheck stubs or 
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MR. EYRE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Plus 4 times $3,665. 
MR. EYRE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Take a moment, counsel, and let's 
see whether we can reach -- find out what that is. 
MR. EYRE: $23,024 total divided by 12. 
THE COURT: I show 23,084, so we're within 
$50 of each other. I'm going to call his income 
$23,050. Her income of $11,000 minus child care 
obligations for ten months making it $6,000 for her 
income for 1993. 
We can calculate then based upon the child 
support obligation worksheet what obligation he has 
from May of '93 through the balance of '93. That then 
would be offset by his obligations on the insurance 
that he has faithfully paid. 
And those obligations are severe in my 
estimation. There must be a way to reduce --
MR. EYRE: Normally those are taken out on, 
you know, just one time a month. 
THE COURT: Well, I want that to be verified 
too because it is generally paid once a month as 
opposed to every two weeks. And they seem high to me. 
MR. EYRE: And clearly we are not obligated 
to pay his life insurance expense. 
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MR. ANDERSON: We haven't figured that in at 
all, your Honor. 
THE COURT: But as to the health and the 
dental, he may have an offset. But isn't there any 
way to reduce those premiums? There must be a way. 
At 100 or whatever it was, 139 every two weeks --
MR. ANDERSON: One hundred and twenty-nine 
something. 
THE COURT: — that seems excessive to me. 
There must be a way, and I'm going to order him to 
explore that and advise his counsel, and through his 
counsel opposing counsel of the means by which he can 
either increase the deductible or make legitimate 
attempts to reduce the premium. Maybe he's explored 
that already. I don't know, but I want him to. 
MR. ANDERSON: That's probably possible if 
it's okay to reduce the quality, I guess, of the 
insurance, in other words, the deductible. 
THE COURT: But at least through 1993 and to 
date I'm going to allow the offsets upon verification 
that's it's paid every two weeks. And, counsel, you 
can secure that easily, I think, those offsets of 
those premiums towards whatever obligation it works 
out on the child support obligation worksheet. Now, 
are we with each other so far? 
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MR. ANDERSON: Agreed, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We've reached some terms 
that you're both going to have to write down. 
$23,050, and $6,000 for her. We are on common basis 
as it relates to the amount of the premium payments 
which can be offset. Working all of that through, we 
will know what his obligations were from May of 1993 
to date. 
Now, next, visitation. I'll allow six weeks 
visitation in the summertime. I truly anticipate that 
the defendant is going to be able to upon reemployment 
as electrical engineer, who is college graduated, 
secure employment and bear the costs associated with 
those six weeks. 
I'll allow every other Christmas. You can 
work out the general schedule as it relates to that, 
counsel. 
I'll allow liberal visitation, liberal 
telephonic visitation. You can both work out the 
details of that, what may be the best time each week 
to call and with some reasonable anticipation that the 
children can generate those calls, also, if they 
choose to do so for whatever purpose, and to otherwise 
keep the parties apprised of the development of their 
children within the community, within school, within 
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of this year. It was with respect to certain matters 
concerning child support, visitation questions, and 
those type of matters. That resulted in an order 
modifying judgment and decree of divorce that 
Mr. Anderson prepared pursuant to the ruling of the 
Court at that time. 
Shortly after that particular hearing in 
February, the plaintiff, Karen Hogan learned that 
there were certain inaccuracies in the testimony of 
Mr. Bradford at that time. Those inaccuracies were 
such to the effect that he did not have a job at that 
time. In fact, he flew directly from Fillmore -- from 
Salt Lake to Maryland, and he had a job. He testified 
to the fact that the only individuals listed on his 
insurance were his children other than himself which 
was also an untruth. He was married at the time and 
had listed his current wife as a party on that 
insurance. 
Upon learning of those facts and receiving 
Mr. Anderson's proposed order, I called him and 
informed him of those facts and told him that based 
upon that information we should modify that order to 
reflect that the deduction for health insurance should 
show the difference between an employee plus one 
policy and an employee plus two policy since he had 
Vonda Bassett CSR, RPR (801) 429-1080 
5 
listed his wife on the insurance, which was a 
substantial difference. 
Presently pursuant to Mr. Anderson's present 
order, he is deducting $325 each month for insurance 
which is the difference between a single and an 
employee plus two. If the deduction was for the 
difference between an employee plus one and employee 
plus two, the difference is only $78.67. 
I pointed -hat out to Mr. Anderson. We had a 
discussion. And I don't think he disagreed with the 
fact that Mr. Bradford had listed his wife on the 
insurance, but there was some disagreement. I also 
wrote him a letter as a follow-up to our telephone 
conversation. 
I thereafter learned that he had submitted 
that order to the Court and the Court has signed that 
order. Subsequently, he did submit an affidavit 
indicating that, yes, he did have a job now and what 
his income was and submitted a child support worksheet 
pursuant to that new income. And that shows a child 
support obligation of Mr. Bradford of $673. 
It's our position that he should receive a 
deduction for his insurance premium only between the 
plan for employee plus one and employee plus two, and 
we agree that is $78.68. 
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THE COURT: Can you advise me -- or, 
Mr. Anderson, can you advise the Court when his 
current wife was placed on that policy? 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes. I think that's reflected 
in the file, and it's reflected in the affidavit that 
he filed, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I know it's subsequent to the 
time -- at least from the affidavit it was subsequent 
to the time that the two children were placed upon the 
policy, but I can't recall the date. 
MR. ANDERSON: His present wife, Barbara 
Bradford, was placed on the policy on July 19th of 
1993, which was subsequent to him purchasing employee 
plus two insurance plan after his two children were 
enrolled. Kristen, I think the way it said, was 
enrolled on March 31st of '87, and Catelyn Bradford 
was enrolled March 21st of '89. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Eyre, you may proceed. 
MR. EYRE: Okay. It's our position that 
Mrs. Bradford should be reimbursed retroactively for 
child support based upon those amounts. And we've 
prepared a schedule which we indicate would be the 
amount that she should be reimbursed. 
THE COURT: Is that the newest schedule that 
this Court is obligated to follow, counsel, as of --
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Court's -- or the divorce decree should be changed. 
THE COURT: Well, what if I agree with you, 
counsel, as it relates to the procedure but indicate 
to you that my understanding of the law, and certainly 
I would have some discretion as it relates to that, is 
that I signed an order dated March the 10th of 1994 
when I did not have full facts. 
It was either not disclosed to me or 
intentionally misrepresented or your client was 
confused as it related to that or he simply didn't 
tell the whole truth because he didn't deem that he 
should tell the whole truth or he didn't think that it 
had any bearing — substantive bearing upon the 
decision of the Court. 
Now, I can do a couple of things, I suspect, 
as it relates to procedure. If you make your motion 
that this is not properly before the Court, I can 
agree to that and strike it from the calendar today, 
but it's going to be back. 
If you want it back, you've got it back. But 
there's going to be a motion or a petition for a 
modification. It's going to be squarely back before 
the Court. 
What is in the best interest of these parties 
as it relates to costs, attorneys' fees, cost of your 
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client to fly out from wherever he is now? Is he in 
Texas or is he in the midwest or where is he? 
MR. ANDERSON: He's in Maryland. 
THE COURT: He can assume also all of those 
costs. 
I'll tell you what I'm going to do. I signed 
an order without all of the facts coming before me. 
And I don't know whether your client was confused, but 
at least there was not a representation of all of the 
facts before me. 
I signed an order based upon the fact that 
two children were placed upon the insurance policy. 
He was entitled at that point in time to have that 
offset against child support. When you talk about who 
may gain from this, it isn't Mrs. Hogan. It happens 
to be the children involved. 
And this Court happens to have the duty as it 
relates to the best interest of the minor children. 
It doesn't become a windfall to Mrs. Hogan. It 
becomes what is legitimately owed to the minor 
children. 
You can come back — we can either stipulate 
as it relates to the issues before the Court, and we 
can proceed and have an order; or we can come back 
with a petition to modify. But I signed that order 
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without all of the facts. I don't know whether it was 
deliberate or not as it relates to your client. 
But I may call him back here to make that 
determination to see whether he deliberately misled 
the Court or whether he was confused or he simply 
didn't tell the whole story. And then I can do that 
on my own, and that may cost him a significant amount 
to fly out here on the Court's own motion to determine 
whether he's in contempt of court on a very, very 
critical and crucial issue before the. Court. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, my client --
THE COURT: The best scenario is that he did 
not tell the whole story. That's the best scenario 
you can paint for your client because he may have been 
misleading. He may have been confused. I don't know 
that. 
But where do we go procedurally? If I grant 
your motion as it relates to the fact that are 
procedurally before the Court, it may be defective, 
but we're going to be right back here in about two 
months. 
MR. ANDERSON: I don't disagree with that, 
and maybe the Court misunderstood me. And my client 
certainly wants to get it resolved today if it can be 
done. And I'm not attempting to side track the 
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issues -- the real issues in the matter by bring:ng 
that procedural point up with the Court. 
What I'm trying to do is focus in on the 
question that the Court answered at the very first, 
and that is what are the issues before the Court. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. ANDERSON: And I thought that was 
important that w^ . understand just why we're hear today 
particularly in light of Mr. Eyre asking for increased 
child support based on facts that have occurred that 
are really not raised in his petition. His petition 
is simply one to set aside the March 10th order. 
And I want to talk just a minute about the 
telephone call we had because I think that's 
important. Again, we're talking about a lot of fluid 
facts that come flowing along in a situation that kind 
of confused it. At least it's confused me. 
But the issue of the phone call, as I recall 
it, was that somewhere along in here Mrs. Hogan's 
husband was employed down in the St. George area, and 
he had insurance available to him that would cover the 
children through his employment. And it was going to 
cost a lot less money than what Mr. Bradford was 
deducting from his child support. Right or wrong, but 
it was less money. So they had requested --
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It finally made a big circle. And hopefully I'm 
trying to bring the Court up to date as to what had 
happened. 
Now, Mr. Bradford does not object to the 
Court understanding and taking into consideration 
today that his wife Barbara is listed on his employee 
plus two insurance policy through his employment 
because she is. As I said, she was put on there in 
July of 1993. 
Mr. Bradford's position is that that doesn't 
matter because that's just a feature, that's just the 
character of the program that's offered to him. He 
can put as many on there as he wants to. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's explore that 
reasoning. 
MR. EYRE: Could I just comment on that, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: It seems to me if that is the 
position of your client, it's well articulated. But 
what you have is two minor children paying for the 
insurance of their father's new wife. 
MR. ANDERSON: And it just comes back to the 
question of who is entitled to that windfall, I guess. 
THE COURT: And if you can --
MR. EYRE: The children should be. 
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he was required to make an election between other 
plans. 
It added in place of $150 deductible plan 
what he calls probably -- oh, it's the Aetna managed 
plan. And this is an HMO type plan where there is no 
deductible. And this is the plan that he advised the 
plaintiff and counsel that he intends to elect for the 
children this coming year, going into effect January 
first. 
It, again, would be an expensive plan. 
Although, as the Court can see from some of the other 
exhibits, it's quite a lot less than it was last year. 
It's just an HMO, but there is no deductible which is 
an advantage to the plaintiff. There is a $10 a visit 
co-pay, and that's all. Otherwise, everything else is 
covered. And that's a significant point in the 1995 
update. Again, it describes what the benefits are. 
THE COURT: Any objection, counsel, the Court 
receiving Defendant's Exhibit No. 3? 
MR. EYRE: To the extent that this is going 
to be an ongoing order, I think the rates for that 
particular plan selected for 1995 are similar. 
There's employee, employee plus one, employee plus two 
plan. It would still be our position that based upon 
those rates, the difference in those ought to be the 
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difference between the employee plus one and employee 
plus two. 
MR. ANDERSON: Exhibit No. 4 --
THE COURT: Okay. The record ought to 
reflect that I've received it with that objection. It 
may be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3 received into 
evidence.) 
MR. ANDERSON: Exhibit No. 4 is 
Mr. Bradford's action plan they call it. It's his 
update of his insurance coverage or his requested 
insurance coverage. 
It's significant because it shows that the 
people listed on his insurance now is his two 
daughters, Catelyn and Kristen and his wife Barbara. 
They did have — they had Catelyn listed 
twice. And that's what he's done is amended that and 
turned it in. 
THE COURT: Any objection to the Court 
receiving Defendant's proposed Exhibit No. 4 
MR. EYRE: No. 
THE COURT: It may be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 4 received into 
evidence.) 
MR. ANDERSON: Exhibit No. 5 is the price or 
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percent? 
MR. EYRE: Not with respect to health 
insurance deductions. 
THE COURT: And that's my thinking also, 
counsel, is that health deductions may in fact be 
automatic at any time the matter is properly before 
the Court, that the Court has an affirmative duty when 
a matter is properly before the Court to take it into 
account and must take it into account, and no new 
order or modify decree can go into effect unless that 
provision has been provided for within the proposed 
order• 
That's my understanding of it. Now, you can 
clarify that for me. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, I understand what the 
Court is saying. 
THE COURT: I think the legislature says the 
Court has the affirmative duty, and no decree in fact 
will enter until that has been complied with. And 
there's an affidavit in the file that indicates that's 
been complied with. 
MR. ANDERSON: The problem that I have with 
that is that the med;cal expense statute 78-45-17.15 
is intertwined and inseparable from the new child 
support schedules. because if you read that, and 
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THE COURT: Whatever the amount is she would 
have an -- whatever this Court determines is the 
legitimate amount for him to offset on a monthly 
basis, she has a one-half obligation of that. And if 
it's several hundred dollars a month, she has one-half 
of that obligation. And if it's $78.67 per month, she 
has one-half of that obligation. 
MR. ANDERSON: If the new statute is 
applicable. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's see. Do you have 
any other exhibits? 
MR. EYRE: Plaintiff's Exhibits 12 and 13 
just show the wife was on the policy as of the date of 
our hearing. And Exhibit 14 shows what the premiums 
are currently for the Met Life 150 plan. 
THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, do you have any 
objection to the Court receiving Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 12, No. 13 and No. 14? 
MR. ANDERSON: I wasn't paying that much 
attention. 
THE COURT: Take a look at those and see if 
you have a question regarding the relevancy. 
MR. ANDERSON: I don't have any objection. I 
think that some of them are outdated, for example, the 
one showing Catelyn twice. 
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He didn't even know she was on there. And 
the one action plan sheet that I handed the Court, 
Exhibit No -- I can't remember -- that's listing who 
is on there now. She's not listed because he made 
sure that her name was taken off the record even 
though she wasn't illegible for insurance anyway. 
THE COURT: Counsel, tell me if I were to 
adopt the position of Mr. Eyre that as of July 1 of 
1994 that the defendant and the plaintiff are to 
assume -- each to assume one-half of the costs, that 
really doesn't effect the child support obligation. 
It simply would indicate an obligation that your 
client may have back to the defendant and what he can 
legitimately offset against his child support 
obligation; right? 
MR. EYRE: That's correct. We reviewed the 
statute with respect to possible use of new 
guidelines. Under the new guidelines his child 
support obligation would be $789 based upon his 
current income rather than the 673. And my 
calculation is that's not quite 25 percent. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further because 
I'm going to take a short recess and review these 
documents in chambers and then rule from the bench. 
It seems to me, counsel, this has been 
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somewhat of a different kind hearing because the 
defendant is not present and Mr. Anderson has had to 
reply to the questions of the Court, and there hasn't 
been any opportunity for cross-examination by 
Mr- Eyre. 
And so we've approached it that way rather 
than continue it at tremendous costs to all of the 
parties. We simply want to get all the matters before 
the Court, the facts before the Court, your arguments 
as it relates to the law, and for this Court to make a 
decision. 
MR. EYRE: The only additional evidence we 
would proffer is just as to attorney's fees as to this 
matter. 
THE COURT: Okay. You may be heard as it 
relates to that. 
MR. EYRE: Your Honor, since our hearing in 
February, I've expended eight hours on this particular 
case. My regular hourly rate is $85, and we're 
requesting attorney's fees of $680. 
THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, do you wish to 
address that? That appears to me to be a reasonable 
in terms of the number of hours and reasonable as it 
relates to the hourly wage. Whether he's entitled to 
it is an issue of law — and you've addressed that 
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offset of medical and dental premiums, then it can 
under the new legislation that went into effect as of 
July 1 of 1994 incorporate any ruling and rely upon 
that statute. Clearly the issue before this Court is 
the appropriateness of the offset of the amounts 
involved. 
I think I indicated at the pretrial, which 
was a conference call, that I believe that the 
defendant was entitled to offset the difference 
between the employee number one, the couple rate, and 
the employee number two, which is the couple plus the 
children, and that I would reserve my judgment until 
hearing — until I had all of the facts before me and 
could review policies and the best arguments before 
the Court. 
I've done that. And I don't think there's 
anything that would indicate that I ought to depart 
from that judgment. What I'm going to do is modify 
the decree or modify the order of March the 10th so 
it's an amended order that would reflect that he's 
entitled -- the defendant is entitled to an offset of 
the difference between what is now employee number 
one, the couple rate, and the employee number two or 
plus two which is the couple plus children rate. 
I don't know what that difference is, but it 
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ranges somewhere between $65.20 and $78.67. And I 
think the defendant is prepared to stipulate at least 
in closing argument that it is $65.20. 
Now, next what to do as it relates to the new 
statute. I believe it ought to apply. What's clearly 
before the Court is what is appropriately offset 
against the child support obligations, and that's 
clearly the intent here of the statute once there's a 
reconsideration of that. 
And I'll exercise my discretion and pronounce 
it that I believe that he is then entitled as of July 
1 of 1994 to an offset of one-half of the difference 
between the employee number one and employee number 
two premium payments which I would think would be 
one-half of $65.20. 
By stating thdt I also obligate the plaintiff 
in a monthly basis of one-half of that amount. 
One-half of $65.20 is owed on a monthly basis or 
whatever amount that may be between a couple rate and 
a couple plus children rate. 
Now, Ifm not persuaded that a pro rata 
fashion is in the best interest of justice, nor am I 
persuaded that these children ought to in any form or 
fashion pay the obligations or premiums of their 
father nor, heaven forbid, the obligations or premiums 
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of his new wife. I could never reach that conclusion. 
Now, what the delinquencies are, counsel, 
will be based upon this ruling together with 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11. And I'm not prepared to 
make those calculations from the bench, but I think 
those calculations can be made based upon this Court's 
order today. 
I'm not going to find him in contempt of 
court because that issue is not before the Court, but 
the oversight or the failure to disclose has caused 
the very fact that we are back here today. 
If I found that to be deliberate, then I 
would find him in contempt of court, assess all costs, 
and perhaps have him held in the Millard County Jail 
to remind him that he has the obligations. But I 
can't reach that. I don't know what his motives were. 
So in light of the fact that I'm not able to 
assess motives and he's not present today for the 
Court to make some enquiry relative to that, the 
parties will each assume their own attorney's fees 
relative to this matter. 
Now, in addition, the parties have stipulated 
that the plaintiff is entitled through whatever 
insurance company the defendant may employ ro be 
provided with documentation regarding issues of 
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says, "The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the 
number of persons covered under the policy and 
multiplying the rerults by the number of children in 
the instance case." 
That's a pro rata. And if if we're going to 
follow and use the new statute, then we need to follow 
that formula which is pro rata. And which is entirely 
different than just using the difference between 
employee plus one and employee plus two. It makes a 
significant difference in dollars. 
THE COURT: It does. But, counsel, I would 
read that specifically where you have a premium that 
would involve a single person, and then you would have 
one that involves a family situation. 
Where you specifically have one that applies 
to a couple rate, and then you can easily calculate 
the difference between a couple rate and a couple plus 
children, then that seems to me to be in the best 
interest of the minor children to allow that offset as 
opposed to a pro rata which I think is more applicable 
under a situation where there's an indistinguishable 
amount, where there's no distinction between a couple 
rate and a couple plus children. 
I think that that legitimately applies where 
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1 you have a single rate and then you have a family 
2 rate. And if the wife or other children are under 
3 that second premium, then you prorate it because you 
4 don't have any basis upon which you could otherwise 
5 determine it. 
6 But where you have the ability to make a 
7 specific calculation between a couple rate and a 
8 couple plus children, then it seems to me that it's 
9 reasonable to apply that formula, the difference 
10 between the two rates. 
11 Okay. Anything further from Plaintiff's 
12 perspective, counselor, at all? 
13 MR. EYRE: No. 
14 THE COURT: Anything further from the 
15 defendant's perspective, counsel? 
16 MR. ANDERSON: If there's going to be a 
17 deficiency owed, can we address the issue of how 
18 that's paid, or is that just sudden death as far as 
19 the defendant is concerned, or what? 
20 THE COURT: Well, if there is a calculated 
21 deficiency under the order of the Court, how do you 
22 wish to address that, counsel? 
23 MR. EYRE: We would indicate that our desire 
24 would be that it be paid within 60 days. If it's not 
25 paid within 60 days, that a judgment be entered and we 
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have the ability to execute on that judgment. 
THE COURT: I think in light of the 
application of the law here, that 60 days is certainly 
not enough time to pay that. I don't know what the 
anticipated deficiency would be under the order of the 
Court. 
MR. EYRE: A little over 2,000. 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. EYRE: A little over $2,000. 
THE COURT: I'll give him twelve months to 
pay that, counsel. 
MR. ANDERSON: I keep -- that's fine, your 
Honor. And I hate to keep bringing up additional 
questions. 
THE COURT: We might as well resolve all of 
this. That's what our discussion is about. 
MR. ANDERSON: I guess I'm just trying to 
clarify it in my mind. The March 10th order required 
him to pay -- provide the insurance — well, I guess 
I'd have to get my -- there was a certain amount set 
out in the order for child support. Let's see if we 
can find the order, 
THE COURT: I have it before me. Actually it 
was recorded on March the 11th of 1994. 
MR. ANDERSON: And the order was that he pay 
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ADDENDUM NO. 4 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON, #0084 
Attorney at Law 
Star Route Box 52 
750 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
(801) 743-6522 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN MARIE BRADFORD, : AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff, : IN RE CHILD SUPPORT 
: OBLIGATION MODIFICATION 
vs. : 
WILLIAM RICHARD BRADFORD, : Civil No. 8677 
Defendant. : 
STATE OFTEXAS ) 
)ss. 
County of ) 
I, William R. Bradford, II, being first duly sworn depose and say that I am the 
Defendant in the above-entitled matter, that I am competent to testify herein if called, and that 
the following matters are within my personal knowledge or belief. 
1. I am submitting this affidavit pursuant to the order of this Court dated March 
10, 1994, modifying Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
2. Following the hearing in this case on February 16, 1994,1 was re-employed by 
1 
Bechtel on or about February 22, 1994, on a temporary assignment. 
3. Based on my first week's pay ending February 27, 1994, I received gross pay 
totaling $875.76. Out of that gross pay $70.28 was deducted for health insurance and $4.80 was 
deducted for dental insurance. 
4. Monthly gross pay equals $3,794.96 and monthly health and dental cost for 
Kristyn and Katelynn Bradford is therefore $325.35 per month. 
5. I have investigated health and dental plans available through my employment 
with Bechtel since the hearing in this case, and I have determined the following facts; 
a) Bechtel offer a three tier premium schedule which charges a set premium 
for; 
i) Employee only 
ii) Employee plus one dependent. 
iii) Employee plus two or more dependents. (Family Coverage) 
(See exhibit A attached hereto) 
6. In order to provide insurance for Kristyn and Katelynn Bradford, my two 
daughters herein, I am required to enroll under the third option above. Bechtel provides the 
insurance on myself as employee, and in order to have Kristyn, added March 31, 1987, and 
Katelynn, added March 21, 1989, to my insurance plan, I am required to have the employee 
plus two plan that results in the deduction from my gross pay recited above. According to the 
rules of the plan it matters not how many over two are also listed on the plan. Therefore, I 
2 
added ray wife Barbara Bradford to the family plan on July 9, 1993. An adult child of mine 
by a previous marriage, Ricki Bradford, is apparently still listed but she is not eligible for any 
benefits under the insurance because of her age. 
DATED this W day of 4P<C- C , 1994. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
1994. 
WILLIAM R. BRADFORD, II 
Ml day of Apr\ 
& y . vAJ/r frYUS) 
lotary Public 
LINDA H. STANISLO 
NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF MARYLAND 
My Commission Expires November 30, 1997 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEFENDANT IN RE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION MODIFICATION, postage 
prepaid, United States Mail, on the_ _dayof_ 
1994, to the following: 
DONALD J. EYRE JR. 
Attorney at Law 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Secretary 
MPR 21 '94 05:22PM P.2/3 \ 
SENT BYiBECHTEt J 3-21-94 J 18:14 : QARO/HR- 14102802373m 1/ 1 
Bechtef 
Qmwatiurg, Maryland 2C678-&386 
(301)4174000 
March 2 1 , IS94 
Mr. William R. Bradford, II 
€09 Jacia Court 
Burleson, TX 76028 
Dear Mr* Bradford, 
This LB to confirm our conversation regarding the exact dates of 
medical plan'enrollments of your dependents, The enrollment 
dates are as follows! 
Ricki L. Bradford Bnrolled 09-12-86 Still listed on plan 
Xriatyn M, Bradford Bnrolled 03-31-87 'Still listed on plan 
Katelynn Bradford Bnrolled 03-21-89 Still listed on plan 
KBTBn M, Bradford Bnrolled 05-08-86 Cancelled 08-31-91 
Barbara A, Bradford Bnrolled 07-19-93 Still listed on plan 
You have had fatally coverage (this means employee plus two or 
more dependents) continuously since dependent, Ricki, was added 
in September of 1986, Bechtel'e medical plan has a three tier 
premium schedule which charge* a set premium for "employee only", 
"employee plus one dependent", or "employee plua two or more 
dependent0". 
If you should need more information regarding coverage for your 
dependents, please let me knew. 
very truly youra, 
Brenda A, Kiener 
Human Resource* Administrator 
ADDENDUM NO. 5 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN M. BRADFORD 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. BRADFORD II, 
Plaintiff; 
Defendant 
Ruling on Defendant's Objection to 
Proposed Order 
CASE NO. 8677 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
Counsel for plaintiff submitted an Order Amending Order Modifying Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce based upon this court's ruling at a hearing conducted on November 9, 
1994, Counsel for defendant filed "Defendant's Objection to Proposed Order". 
I 
Discussion 
The court has carefully considered the proposed Order and Defendant's Objection to 
Proposed Order. The fact of the matter is that the second hearing in this case was necessary 
because of defendant's material misrepresentations to the court tinder oalh at the first hearing. 
Because defendant was not present at the second hearing, the court was not able to inquire 
and determine whether those material misrepresentations were occasioned through negligence, 
gross negligence, or through a flat out attempt to deceive this court. It is the position of this 
court that but for the misrepresentation and perhaps deceit, the post July 1994 hearing 
respecting these issues would not have been necessary. 
This court found, at the post July hearing, through extensive proffer, that the 
insurance arrangement of defendant with his employer was materially and substantially 
different than that represented in the pre-July hearing. 
Ruling 
1. The argument contained in defendant's objection to paragraph 6 of the proposed 
order is rejected. 
82/07/95 12:29 S 801 6234522 S0162345Z2EV P.03 
2. Defendant's argument in his paragraph No- 2 is rejected. This argument was 
exhausted at hearing. 
3. Defendant's argument in paragraph No.l 3 was exhausted and rejected at hearing. 
Accordingly, the court will execute the proposed order as tendered by counsel for 
plaintiff. 
Dated this /*?day of January, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
/ L Y N N W. DAVIS, JUDGE 
cc: Juab County Atty 
Dexter Anderson, Esq. 
